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 Computers were not built with security in mind. As such, security has and still 
often takes a back seat to performance. However, in an era where there is so much 
sensitive data being stored, with cloud storage and huge customer databases, much has to 
be done to keep this data safe from intruders. 
 Control flow hijacking attacks, stemming from a basic code injection attack to 
return-into-libc and other code re-use attacks, are among the most dangerous attacks. 
Currently available solutions, like Data execution prevention that can prevent a user from 
executing writable pages to prevent code injection attacks, do not have an efficient 
solution for protecting against code re-use attacks, which can execute valid code in a 
malicious order. 
 To protect against control flow hijacking attacks, this work proposes architecture 
to make Control Flow Integrity, a solution that proposes to validate control flow against 
pre-computed control flow graph, practical. Current implementations of Control Flow 
Integrity have problems with code modularity, performance, or scalability, so I propose 











 Computers were not built with security in mind. As such, security has and still 
often takes a back seat to performance. However, in an era where there is so much 
sensitive data being stored, with cloud storage and huge customer databases, much has to 
be done to keep this data safe from intruders. 
 Many solutions are available on the market--network solutions do a good job of 
filtering and finding many intrusions.  However, they are not infallible. When network 
solutions fail, you need a good host-based IDS (intrusion detection system). Signature 
and anomaly-based solutions are the norm currently, with some compartmentalization 
and low-level memory-based security solutions available. For situations where security is 
of utmost importance, though, heuristic solutions may not be sufficient--we need a strong 
low-level protection solution to make a system provably secure. On the other hand, one 
must not throw aside performance and compatibility in the effort of making a secure 
system. 
 I argue that a strong memory-level protection, in particular, the control flow 
integrity (CFI)[1] paradigm, should be used to secure a system, and I offer a solution that 
addresses the shortcomings of current proposals in terms of scalability, modularity, and 
overhead. 
Motivation & History 
 Computer systems are constantly under attack, and as security improves, so do the 
attacks. To understand the vulnerabilities, one must first go through the types of attacks 
available to understand the vulnerabilities we aim to protect. In this case, we aim to 
protect against control flow hijacking attacks. 
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One of the earliest types of attack techniques is a code injection attack. This 
technique usually involves use of buffer overflow to get the program to execute code on 
the stack. This type is largely protected against by hardware W(+)X or Data Execution 
Protection [2] techniques that stop code from being both writable and executable.  
Instead, we turn our attention to code re-use attacks. To circumvent W(+)X 
mechanisms, code re-use attacks use code regions that have already been cleared to run. 
The earliest type, called return-into-libc (RILC) [3] attacks, involves changing a return 
address to return to linked library code in an unexpected way for an attack. RILC can 
involve calling system calls to create a writable and executable memory region to 
perform previous attacks. More expressive attacks, called Return-Oriented Programming 
[4] / Jump-Oriented Programming [5], base their attacks on the idea that code fragments 
ending in returns or jumps can be combined to form a Turing-complete programming 
method. 
Currently in-use protection mechanisms of Data Execution Prevention and 
Address Space Layout Randomization [6] are efficient, but do not fully protect the user. 
DEP can be countered by code re-use attacks while ASLR can be defeated [7] [8], so 
there is a need for a stronger protection against control flow hijacking attacks.  
 Proposed Solution – Practical Control Flow Integrity 
Control Flow Integrity (CFI)[1], proposed by Abadi, et al. is a powerful security 
paradigm for protecting against generic control flow attacks. Control Flow Integrity 
works by verifying the branches of a program by comparing the current branch to 
branches in a pre-computed Control Flow Graph (CFG). The theory proposed by CFI is 
strong as it prevents control flow hijacking at a very basic level—by restricting the 
number of valid branches to a small set. However, the implementations proposed have all 
come at a cost of a combination of problems, including some set of binary compatibility, 
performance, or scalability, and, as a result, CFI has not found widespread adoption. 
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The main issues of CFI techniques can be shown by observing the dichotomy of 
CFI techniques--many papers propose using an inlined-CFG and many others propose to 
use a meta-CFG. Inlined CFG’s, as in the original CFI paper by Abadi, et al., offer 
relatively low performance overhead as the CFG has the same locality as the instruction 
stream. This comes at the cost of binary rewriting, which increases binary size and, more 
importantly, decreases compatibility of libraries as the offsets are changed. Techniques 
based on meta-CFG’s, on the other hand, require no binary rewriting but are often 
plagued with large performance overhead due to the explicit tracking of state and context 
switching needed to perform the checks. 
I propose to use a Bloom-filter-based implementation [9] to overcome the 
implementation issues of the previous dichotomy of CFI, and I further improve upon it to 
introduce scalability and locality. A Bloom-filter-based design that stores branches into a 
single Bloom filter could obviate the use of the binary rewriting that causes modularity 
issues while simultaneously provide a stateless way to check branches efficiently. 
However, when one considers that all relevant branches / branch signatures must fit 
within this single Bloom filter structure, concerns about the scalability of this approach 
come up.  
Y. Shi and G. Lee have previously proposed a single stateless 32kB Bloom filter 
design to verify (source || destination || “execution path”) branch behaviors [10]. Given 
that a recently added uop cache in Intel’s Sandy Bridge architecture used ~6kB and 
required simplification of other branch prediction logic to fit it [11], I argue the space 
requirements of the previous Bloom filter proposal are both too large space-wise, and 
worse yet, not large enough as “gcc” could not fit in this Bloom filter structure[10]. I 
believe this scalability issue is what prevents adoption of a stateless control flow integrity 
solution, and offer a solution in this work.  
I propose a 2kB blocked Bloom filter, called Bloom Cache, which caches smaller 
64B blocked Bloom filters to reduce the cache space requirements, with new methods to 
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maintain spatial and temporal locality to the proposed structure to reduce its pressure on 
memory. The proposed methods include a new way to make use of dynamic locality by 
drawing from compressed cache architecture ideas and a new way to organize blocked 
Bloom filters to increase spatial locality. 
The main contribution of this work is in solving the debilitating scalability and 
compatibility issues of current Control Flow Integrity implementations. 
 
New contributions in this work include: 
0. Blocked-Bloom-filter-based approach to overcome scalability and modularity 
issues from previous approaches 
1. A method to maintain spatial locality in a blocked Bloom filter design 
2. A dynamic / static method to add temporal locality in an unbalanced blocked 
Bloom filter design 
3. New method to add the ability to trade security and performance dynamically 





There are a wide variety of security solutions available, including various types of 
network-based security and host-based security. To achieve a suitable level of security 
efficiently, network administrators and end hosts usually employ security at multiple 
levels. 
General / Network Security 
In terms of network solutions available, firewall, port checking, intrusion 
detection systems (IDS), and encryption are widely used [12]. Firewalls and port 
scanning for vulnerabilities can be used to protect against exploits on ports, and, when 
integrated with application-level or host-based IDS, firewalls can also protect 
applications. With respect to IDS, signature-based, anomaly-based, and flow-based are 
the most common. Signature-based solutions work by finding a signature of a previously 
seen attack and verifying against this signature. Signature-based solutions are effective 
against previously-seen attacks but are unable to detect new attacks. Anomaly-based 
solutions work by classifying normal-use patterns and generating warnings when 
behavior deviates from the supposed behavior. Anomaly-based solutions can be used to 
protect against zero-day attacks, but this comes at a cost of higher false positive rate and 
can miss attacks that have normal traffic patterns. Flow-based solutions keep track of the 
state of connections and sessions, and, using this information, flow-based solutions can 
also detect anomalous behavior. Encryption in general also provides confidentiality and 
can also provide integrity. 
The scope of this paper, however, largely deals with end host security, which is 





 In addition to the behavior-based solutions of before, host-based solutions often 
comprise of two categories: compartmentalization and memory-level protection. 
Compartmentalization is useful in keeping attacks localized from integral resources while 
memory-level protection more directly monitors memory access to protect memory 
integrity and control flow. 
 Compartmentalization is often used as a general security measure and exists in many 
forms—rule-based policies and virtualization being very popular. Rule-based policies 
offer an OS-level protection in general by restricting access to files and transactions with 
permissions, and this level of protection is commonly seen in the form of Role-based 
Access Control [13], Mandatory Access Control, Discretionary Access Control, Bell-
LaPadula model, Clark-Wilson, and the other similar policies.  Virtualization policies are 
also often proposed due to virtual machine’s inherent separation of resources. These 
approaches include the recent TrustZone [14] and Hypervisor-based [15] capabilities. 
Trustzone works by having a secure zone and an insecure zone with kernel and user level 
capabilities. Its API ferries instructions between the zones and manages to keep important 
data secure.  Hypervisor-based, like Hypersafe [16], concepts work by keeping the actual 
kernel small and protected while virtualizing other operating systems so the attacks are 
localized to the virtualized operating system.  There are various other ideas, such as 
HyperCoffer [17] and HyperCheck [18], that improve upon such concepts, but the 
concept is generally similar. 
Memory-level Protection 
         Another general approach is protecting against memory attacks themselves[19].  
There are many levels of memory an attacker can mount an attack on, and most of such 
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memory attacks can be categorized into code corruption attacks, control-flow hijacking 
attacks, data-only attacks, and information leaks. There are a multitude of solutions 
against the latter two types of attacks, such as memory safety, data integrity, and data-
flow integrity [20]. Such concepts are interesting in theory, but sadly, not much 
deployment has been seen in these fields as their overheads are higher than industry can 
accept. The story, however, is different for control-flow hijacking. There has been some 
active deployment, in the form of Data Execution Protection [2], Address Space Layout 
Randomization[6], and other compiler-based techniques, as protection on this layer is 
more efficient, making control flow protection a promising direction to follow. 
 Data Execution Protection (also called W(+)X protection) [2], introduced to Linux 
and Windows in 2004, protects on a hardware level by making sure a page is not both 
writable and executable at the same time. Making sure a page is not executable and 
writable at the same time defeats many code injection attacks in that DEP can make the 
stack not executable. DEP is a very useful first step in maintaining code integrity, but it 
does not catch all cases as it is vulnerable to code re-use attacks, which uses code that has 
previously been approved as valid executable code. Compiler improvements have 
bolstered the defenses against most return-into-libc attacks, but there are still code re-use 
attacks that have not been properly defended against 
 Address Space Layout Randomization [6] is also commonly used in commodity 
hardware. ASLR is based on the premise that randomizing locations of libraries and 
important information makes it more difficult for an attacker to launch an effective 
attack. There are exploits to ASLR [7][8], but due to its low overhead and widespread 
integration, it is used in most systems currently. 
Recent literature has also proposed new ideas to protect stack and memory. 
Dynamic Information Flow Tainting [21] works by marking, or “tainting,” potentially 
insecure instructions and keeping track of what the “tainted” instruction has accessed. 
This method is efficient and can protect a system if tuned correctly per application, but it 
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has a downside that false positives could propagate the taint unnecessarily. Another 
proposed mechanism works by finding kernel-level or other program invariants and 
making sure those values are not changed [22]. These proposals are interesting, but they 
may not provide full protection as they assume an attack that modifies the kernel. Others 
yet provide stack protection [23] and pointer protection [24], which provide some bounds 
checking to counter buffer overflows. 
 Additionally, Control Flow Integrity is a promising idea that lies in the category of 
memory defense. Control Flow Integrity works by verifying all branches against a pre-
computed control flow graph. Current proposed implementations have not seen industry 
use due to problems with compatibility and performance overhead. As such, there is 
room for improvement. 
Bloom Filters 
 A Bloom filter is a space-efficient structure with constant access times that can 
quickly tell when an element is part of a set of elements stored in the Bloom filter.  A 
Bloom filter is similar to a hash structure and in general works by having multiple 
independent hashes that can set or check corresponding bits in a block of memory. 
Starting with an empty block of memory initialized to all 0’s, insertion works by setting, 
for example, 3 bits as 1’s.To check whether an element is in the Bloom filter, all one has 
to do is hash to find the 3 corresponding bits in the example and check if they are all 1’s. 
This method allows constant space usage for any number and size of elements. However, 
as more elements are inserted, the possibility of a new element being decided that it is 
already part of the set increases as more of the bits are set to 1. Thus, Bloom filters allow 
one to trade a small false positive rate for a lower amount of space used [25]. There are 
many variations on this basic Bloom filter, and this work in general is loosely based on a 
blocked Bloom filter design. 
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 A variation I make use of in this work is called a blocked Bloom filter. In the 
blocked Bloom filter, a single large Bloom filter is divided into smaller Bloom filter 
“blocks.” Membership testing is done by first indexing into the right “block” and 
subsequently performing a normal Bloom filter membership check on that smaller 
“block.” This allows for better cache performance by making localizing the N-bit 
comparisons in a bloom filter check to a single cacheline. This provides improved 
accesses in hardware, but the hashing to decide which block to index into is still random 
and thus could be improved.  I make use of this organization by further introducing 




LITERATURE REVIEW OF CFI IMPLEMENTATIONS 
 Control Flow Integrity offers a strong general control-flow hijacking protection, but 
current implementations have not seen widespread use due to various weaknesses 
existing within each implementation. Current implementations can be widely categorized 
as being either primarily hardware or primarily software-based. Within those solutions, 
they can additionally be subdivided into inlined and meta-CFG approaches. 
CFI – Software-based – inline vs. meta-CFG 
 The original CFI paper [1] proposed a software method of inlining checking code 
and verification tags into the binary directly. This proposal was effective in that it had 
offered a way to implement CFI purely with software and with tags that had the same 
locality as the code. As a reference, the performance overhead was a modest 16% on 
average. A potential reason why this approach has not seen widespread use is that it 
employs binary rewriting, which increases binary size and changes function offsets. 
Changing the offsets upsets code modularity/compatibility by changing the addresses 
external functions must call. Additionally, the tags are “imprecise” in that function calls 
that have the same destination must be part of the same group, making the protection 
weaker. There are many other proposals that employ binary rewriting to perform checks 
[26] [27].  
 An alternative method to using code rewriting is to compare against a meta-CFG, a 
control flow graph that is separate from the source code. These papers mostly use some 
interrupt on indirect branches to check if the branches match a pre-computed CFG [28]. 
These papers are in general plagued with overhead caused by the excessive context 
switching necessary for the checks and often use potentially large CFG files. There are 
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optimizations in terms of less frequent checks [28] and more local storing methods to 
increase locality, but performance overhead is generally high. 
CFI -- Hardware-based  
 Branch Regulation [4] is a recent proposal that annotates function bounds into the 
binary to compare for validity of branches. Branch Regulation introduces a small 
comparator unit into the pipeline to check if branches are within bounds and finds the 
bounds by looking up either in software or a hardware cache of recent function bounds. 
This is an approximation of CFI that looks promising. 
  Shi [10] proposes an interesting way to implement CFI. It proposes to store the 
(source||destination||branch history) behavior signatures into a hardware Bloom filter of a 
set size and checks branches by testing if the (src||dst||bh) tuple is part of the set. 
Employing a Bloom filter to store valid patterns has the properties of being space-
efficient and having good access times despite no explicit controlling of state. As this 
method falls under the category of meta-CFG, it also removes the binary compatibility 
problem introduced by binary rewriting. However, the configuration proposed comes at 
the cost of scalability, area, and potentially context switching inertia. As the hardware 
Bloom filter was designed to be a set size, branches that do not fit inside the Bloom filter 
must instead be checked in software. The implementation proposed uses a 32kB Bloom 
filter, with potentially 2 extra Bloom filters to lower false positive rates. The 32kB Bloom 
filter was also not able to fit gcc execution and could cause expensive software checks. In 
the event of a context switch, the 32kB would also likely need be flushed and re-read the 
next time the program receives execution time. Overall, it seems space and scalability 
were not sufficiently considered. 
Room for Improvement 
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 Current proposals have some room for improvement: software methods have 
problems with code modularity or performance and hardware implementations could be 
approximate or not scalable. I offer a solution based on blocked Bloom filters that solves 
issues of code modularity and performance from software implementations, and I 







Figure 1: General Bloom Cache Design 
 As a high-level overview, the proposed Bloom Cache stores (src, dst) tuples into a 
Bloom filter structure and verifies branches seen during program execution by checking 
for set inclusion in the full Bloom filter structure. However, internally, the tuples are 
stored and accessed in a way such that it will perform well in cache regardless of the 
number of valid execution paths. An example configuration of a Bloom Cache would be 
a full Bloom filter that uses a 2kB cache composed of 32 64-Byte Bloom filter blocks to 
cache active branch patterns. Examples in this chapter use 64B Bloom filter blocks to 
store 64 branches to have a ~2% false positive rate [25]. 
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 The basic premise of the Bloom Cache is that by dividing the Bloom filter into 
spatially and temporally local blocks and keeping only relevant blocks in cache, one can 
verify branches efficiently with a minimal amount of area while maintaining performance 
and stateless properties gained from employing Bloom filters. To help understand the 
proposed Bloom Cache design, I will go through various designs to show how the 
proposed design addresses scalability and subsequently locality of references. 
 4a. Blocked Bloom provides a good starting framework. 
 4b+c. Static Blocked Bloom ideas provide spatial locality, but has limits. 
 4d. Dynamic Blocked Bloom ideas incorporate temporal locality dynamically. 
Blocked Bloom Filter – Scalability and Area Requirements 
 
 A single large Bloom filter, as proposed in [10], has the property of constant access 
regardless of space, but it comes at a cost of flexibility and scalability as a hardware 
Bloom filter must be designed to a certain size. More elements can continuously be put 
into a Bloom filter of set size, but the false positive rate will increase until a degenerate 
case where every single branch that is checked is deemed valid. To alleviate the problem 
of scalability, I propose to use a blocked Bloom filter. 
 A blocked Bloom filter works by storing a Bloom filter into multiple smaller Bloom 
filter “blocks.” To decide which block to access to perform a Bloom filter check, one first 
hashes a value to find the index of the Bloom filter block. This basic idea allows smaller 
Bloom filter blocks to be placed in and out of cache as needed.  
However, using a blocked Bloom filter as is comes at a cost of locality. Since 
values are hashed to find which Bloom filter block to access, the access to the blocks are 
random--this would require the whole Bloom filter to fit into memory or cache to still be 
efficient. To introduce locality in the blocks to reduce random access patterns, I propose 
ignoring the lower order bits in the (src, dst) pairs to decide which block to access. With 
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this method, branches with similar spatial locality would be grouped together, reducing 
the number of random accesses. Introduction of spatial locality into the structure was 
effective at reducing the number of memory accesses the cache must make, as hit rates in 
subsequent configurations are easily >90%. 
 
Figure 2: Blocked Bloom Filter 
 This method of indexing blocks increases spatial locality, but it unbalances the 
Bloom filter blocks because valid branches patterns are not uniformly distributed. 
However, this provides a starting framework that has: 
1. Scalability, in that only a small portion of the Bloom filter needs to be cached 
at a time 
2. Spatial locality of reference, in that branches are more likely to branch to 
spatially local instructions 
 16 
 3. Unbalanced blocks, as valid branch patterns are not uniformly distributed 
Spatially-Ideal Static Blocked Bloom Filter  
 
Figure 3: Static Blocked Bloom Filter 
 A simple solution to unbalanced blocks would be to just combine spatially local 
blocks.  This is a static method to increase spatial locality and balance the Bloom filter 
blocks. As is shown in a later section (6a), blindly combining spatially local blocks 
initially increases performance but reduces in effectiveness as more branches are added 
into the structure. Thus, this organization, while it improves upon previous 
implementations in terms of locality, is not fully scalable. This scalablity is addressed in 
section (4d) by adding temporal locality. 
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The current implementation of this structure ignores the organization needed to 
find the corresponding Bloom filter blocks and is provided to show potential gains from 
using only spatial locality. One could potentially implement this by using a mapping 
structure as shown, or one could more efficiently merge local blocks by using a K-map 
representation. Additionally, one could combine temporally local blocks by profiling the 
application, but this is left for future work. 
Hierarchical Bloom Filter  
 
Figure 4: Hierarchical Bloom Filter 
 To implement the ideally local described in the previous section, one can implement 
a tree structure to organize the blocked Bloom filters. An 8-way btree is presented as an 
example. The space overhead from using this method is low, but this method requires 
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multiple accesses to find the corresponding Bloom entry. Additionally, as the number of 
branches increases, the number of accesses needed to find the corresponding Bloom entry 
increases. 
 Dynamic Bloom Cache - Dynamic Locality and Configurable Security  
 
Figure 5: Dynamic Bloom Cache 
 I introduce a dynamic Bloom cache to incorporate temporal locality dynamically in 
an unbalanced blocked Bloom filter design. Based on the property that two Bloom filter 
blocks can be combined with a simple bitwise OR, I combine sparse blocks in the cache 
structure. The full bloom filter is kept sparse, but the Bloom Cache combines blocks 
temporarily to better utilize the cache space alotted. This allows the Bloom cache to have 
multiple temporal contexts in one Bloom block and to ideally have 64 branches in every 
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64B block cached despite the full Bloom filter being unbalanced. To maintain the 
mapping of indices to corresponding merged blocks, I propose to either use a structure 
similar to a variable-segment cache [38] or a highly associative CAM structure similar to 
a TLB. The idea of a variable-segment cache is that one can increase effective memory 
storage by storing multiple compressed blocks into a single physical block. To implement 
this, one uses multiple tags per indexed block.  
 This dynamic Bloom allows for both spatial locality and temporal locality, but it 
also comes with other interesting properties. Since the blocks are combined during cache 
Bloom insertion, one can additionally dynamically control the rate of false positives, by 
choosing the level of Bloom filter fill. For example, if the program is executing system 
calls or potentially vulnerable library calls, one could set the maximum fill from 64 
branches to 32 branches per 64B and subsequently reduce the false positive rate from 2% 
to 0.1% [25], increasing the level of security at the cost of some performance loss due to 
the halved effective cache capacity. Conversely, if code is known to be relatively safe, 
one can fit, for example, 100 branches in a block for a false positive rate of 10%. 
Alternatively, one could even potentially profile hit rate and automatically increase 
Bloom Cache fill ratio to increase hit rate when the workload is memory intensive or 
lower fill rate to keep a high level of security in the general case when memory is not in 
heavy use. 
Specific Implementation Issues  
 Since the blocked Bloom filter is unbalanced, the full Bloom filter itself can be 
sparse, as there are many indices (and corresponding blocks) with 0 branches inside. To 
allocate 64B regardless would make all accesses quick, but the amount of space required 
would be too large per program. One could create a map, similar to a page table, to find 
the corresponding location, but even approach that has its limits. To handle the empty 
blocks from an unbalanced blocked Bloom filter, I use a technique from [29] called 
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“Cuckoo Hashing.” Cuckoo Hashing is similar to a hash table in that the index is hashed 
to find the proper storage location. However, Cuckoo Hashing works by having two 
independent hashes and allowing each block to be in one of the two places calculated by 
the two independent hashes. When an insertion has a collision with a previous block, 
other blocks are shifted around their two valid positions until all the blocks fit. This 
results in a fill rate of about 50%.  
 An example of fill rate and size requirements for a full blocked Bloom filter is 
shown here. This example shows storage requirements of bzip2 benchmark. For spatial 
locality, this configuration ignores 10 least-significant bits of source and destination 
addresses for locality and uses 10 higher-order bits of source and destination addresses to 
index the block. In this particular configuration, there are 8 tags per Bloom index to allow 
for dynamic combination of blocks in the Dynamic Bloom Cache. 
Table 1: Example memory usage of a Dynamic Bloom Cache 
Number of branches: 1392  Number of mappings: 364   
Max Fill: 65 Average Fill: 3.824176 Stddev: 169.099814 
Bloom Filter Size: 2048 B 
Tagging overhead: 800 B 
Full Map size – dynamic bloom without hash map – single access: 65536 kB 
Full Map size – dynamic bloom with cuckoo hash: 45 kB 
Full Map size – dynamic bloom minimum space: 22 kB 
Full Map size – single Bloomfilter minimum space: 1 kB 
 In general, the average fill is not high (3.8 out of 64 that can be stored to maintain a 
2% false positive), so the space required in disk / main memory (map size) may be higher 
than a single Bloom filter. However, storing Bloom filters in the blocked format 
reduces the amount of quickly-accessible cache space needed, as blocks can be loaded 
and evicted as needed. This particular design needs 2048B of Bloom filter and 800B for 
tags, as opposed to the 32kB requested in [10]. As access patterns in general program 
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execution exhibit spatially and temporally local branch accesses, the hit rate of such a 





 To model overhead, I have used MacSim [30], a trace-based heterogeneous 
architecture timing model simulator that is based on a Pin front-end [31].  MacSim has 
been shown to be very accurate and efficient and papers using MacSim have been 
accepted and presented in renowned conferences such as ISCA.  Pin trace-generation is 
supported by Intel and has been shown to be very efficient with many recent papers have 
been using pin in their timing simulations. 
 To model the delay, I perform a branch-verification on every branch target miss, as 
branch target hits are branches that have been seen and thus verified before. As the 
Bloom hashing and accessing timings were shown to be less than branch misprediction 
penalty in [Shi] and can thus be masked, the Bloom hashing is modeled as zero additional 
delay. The performance overhead is modeled by stalling the execution on a Bloom block 
mapping miss, as the Bloom Cache must load the relevant Bloom filter block from 
memory into cache. 
 The CPU modeled is a 4-instruction-wide single-core x86 architecture with out-of-
order micro-op timing simulation to more accurately represent commercially available 
computers. A branch target buffer is used to predict branch targets. Memory parameters 




 The proposed Bloom filters will be compared by running timing simulations on 1 
billion representative instructions picked by SimPoint [32] [33] from the Spec2006 [34] 
benchmarks. The full Bloom filters are populated by collecting a branch trace from start-
to-end execution of the benchmarks. Overall, the Bloom Cache seems to perform 
reasonably well as it maintains Bloom block mapping hit rates of > 98% despite using 
cache space significantly smaller than the number of branches in the full Bloom filter. 
 To show the overhead of the proposed research, this chapter will simulate various 
granularities of branch verification and show general performance overheads of the 
different approaches. The chapter will start by start by simulating the overhead for 
verifying both indirect and direct branches by using a full bloom filter trained from the 
set of 1 billion instructions (6a). This simulation is intended to compare the overhead in 
using the different proposed configurations. Subsequent sections use full bloom filters 
that store indirect branches trained from entire program execution. The next section (6b) 
models overhead from checking only indirect branches. Checking only indirect branches 
for verification is based on the notion that direct conditional branches and direct calls 
have set targets, so direct branches are not vulnerable to attack as long as the stack is 
protected by DEP. As for not checking return instructions, return instructions can be 
protected with a shadow call stack[1]. Following that, in section (6c), use of additional 
dynamic branch signatures to improve security are examined. 
Check All Branches 
 As shown in N-jump [35] suitable protection can be achieved by verifying all 
branches. The initial set of experiments is intended as a quick measure of performance 
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characterization between the different approaches. The Bloom filter is also filled with 
both direct and indirect branches seen in the 1 billion instruction trace. 
Run time: (Run time with branch verification / Run time without branch verification) 
Table 2: Performance overhead from checking direct and indirect branches 
 # branches Static ideal Static 
Hierarchical 
Dynamic 4-




Astar 638 1.000003 1.000003 1.000009625 1.000009625 
bzip2 1355 0.999994 0.999994 1.000004994 1.000004671 
Gcc 7855 1.027268 1.051634 1.090702527 1.072012034 
Gobmk 10259 1.081345 1.169818 1.055456873 1.025391371 
Hmmer 862 1.000000 1.000000 1.00002276 1.000123803 
Mcf 108 1.000011 1.000011 0.999898896 0.999898896 
perlbench 11023 1.118754 0.88112* 0.86273851* 0.869153918* 
Sjeng 1616 1.000273 1.000331 1.000579725 1.000003715 
Avg 3242 1.015556 1.031685 1.020953629 1.013920588 
*perlbench results give odd results at times. A possible explanation is that the 
assumed location of the full bloom filter location is memory actively used by the 
benchmark. Average overheads do not include perlbench. 
 
It can be seen that in most cases, because the number of valid branches to check 
are small, most of the Bloom filter can fit into the Bloom cache and thus almost always 
have the Bloom mappings hit. This causes overhead in most of the cases, namely, the 
programs with < 2000 valid branches, to be negligible.  However, in the case of gcc, 
gobmk, and perlbench, there are more valid branches, and we can see slowdown resulting 
from accessing the full Bloom filter. It can be seen that the static configurations that only 
consider of spatial locality do not scale as the number of branches increase, as the 
performance degrades significantly once the number of valid branches is over 8000. As 
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for dynamic configurations that account for temporal locality, the performance 
degradation is bound instead by 7%, and benchmarks with more branches do not 
necessarily perform worse as their branch patterns could have more temporal locality and 
hit in the Bloom cache more often. In the case of gcc, the static configurations actually 
outperform the dynamic configurations: this is because gcc is more memory-intensive, 
and blocked Bloom configurations with larger full Bloom filters on disk could take up 
more space in L2 or L3 caches, weakening the verification performance. A way to avoid 
using cache space that memory-intensive applications could be to increase the Bloom 
cache size and read all of the blocks directly from memory without caching in L2 or L3 
caches. For this to be efficient, the Bloom cache map must have a very high hit rate. 
I have shown here some example dynamic Bloom cache hit rates with respect to 
the set-associativity of the cache and the number of tags per Bloom map index. These hit 
rates are calculated with respect to gcc benchmark, which has 7855 valid branches that 
would not fit in a 2kB cache. The 2kB cache at maximum capacity, with 64 branches in 
every 64B bloom block in the bloom cache, can only store 2000 branches at a time. 
However, due to the ability of the proposed dynamic bloom cache to make use of spatial 
and temporal locality, the hit rates of the blocked bloom filters are often >97%.  
Replacement policies used: Insert lowest index available. LRU replacement. 
Table 3: Dynamic Bloom Cache hit rates for different configurations 
2k bloom (10bits 
locality, 10bits 
length)  4x tags 8x tags 16x tags 
4-way 0.939268 0.972968 0.974493 
8-way 0.942910 0.977540 0.978780 
16-way 0.945344 0.980631 0.981734 
fully associative 0.946806 0.983017 0.983416 
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 It can be seen that the hit rate receives the most benefit from having 8x the number 
of tags as the number of physical Bloom mappings, so subsequent configurations assume 
8x the number of tags as physical indexes. 
Check All Indirect Branches 
 From [10], it can be seen that the most vulnerable of branches are indirect branches 
and returns, as an attacker can change the value in a register to potentially jump to any 
location he wants. To protect against code re-use attacks, verifying all of the indirect 
branches was said to be sufficient. The valid indirect branches are obtained by running a 
program to completion. 
 The overhead in checking all indirect branches are as follows: 
Table 4: Performance overhead from checking indirect branches 
Check indirect 
branches 









branches except ret) 
Astar 983 1.032605780 0.999996226 
bzip2 1392 1.058523978 0.999996386 
Gcc 19241 1.004170487 1.001347175 
Gobmk 7483 1.164263847 0.997408238 
Hmmer 1624 1.000721573 1.002443695 
Mcf 487 1.025255816 1.000000000 
Perlbench 13700 0.877273072* 1.004178741 
Sjeng 1028 1.116015178 0.999779594 
Average 5742 1.057365 1.000139 
*perlbench results are not included in the average. 
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 The average performance overhead in checking all indirect branches is 5.7% while 
not checking returns gives performance overhead of .01%. This shows that the overhead 
in checking returns are modest as returns can return to many potential call sites. The 
return checking overhead can be reduced by checking on return-address-stack misses, but 
this has not been simulated yet. 
Different Branch Signatures 
 In addition to keeping track of (src, dst) pairs, one could provide additional security 
by checking against a dynamic execution path. This would prevent users from using valid 
branches in a potentially abusive order. One could add information from past branch 
direction histories as in a branch history register (BHR), called Execution Path in [10], or 
one could be more specific and have a history of calling site by storing the LSB of the 
previous branch pc in a Path History Register (PHR). Used in combination, this can 
verify that the previous N branches were the same and that those previous N branches 
executed in the same direction as before. 
 The following table shows the number of indirect branch signatures 
(src||dst||bhr||phr) for start-to-end runs of benchmark applications: 
Table 5: Number of (src||dst||bhr||phr) branch signatures in each benchmark 
2k bloom 
0-bit 
phr+bhr 1-bit 2-bit 4-bit 8-bit 
astar 983 983 1090 1307 2189 
bzip2 1392 1392 1532 1782 2680 
gcc 19241 19241 22850 32846 61181 
gobmk 7483 7483 9061 13163 28664 
hmmer 1624 1624 1740 2137 3190 
mcf 487 487 530 611 867 
perlbench 13700 13700 14812 25577 54844 
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Table 5 continued 
sjeng 1028 1028 1226 1927 5221 
 
 For most applications, the behavior signatures do not increase much when more 
dynamic path verification is added because paths taken just before indirect branches seem 
to be consistent up to about 4 paths. However, when one takes branch histories of 8 
previous paths, most applications see a significant jump in number of signatures, meaning 
that the many possible control flows preceding the current control flow is too erratic. 
Using too long of a history would decrease performance and require longer training 




EXAMPLE ATTACK – BUFFER OVERFLOW 
An example buffer overflow attack is shown here to show the efficacy of the 
proposed bloom filter design [12]. 
 
Figure 6: Buffer overflow example code 
 This code base shows a standard buffer overflow potential, where a command line 




Figure 7: Buffer overflow in action 
 With such a small input buffer, one can overwrite the verification flag with a 
sufficiently long input string, as denoted by the input string of 30 x’s. This constitutes a 
data-only attack, and is not detected by the branch verification proposed. However, if one 
supplies an even longer input string, one can overwrite the value in the potentially 
vulnerable return instruction and branch to an arbitrary location. This is potentially a 
control flow hijacking attempt as it could reroute execution flow to code specified by the 
attacker. This will be caught by Control Flow Integrity implementations as the aberrant 
return would be checked against valid branches and be found not to be valid, unless it 







Further considerations for the proposed Bloom blocked design include (1) 
dynamically changing protection levels, (2) buffering checks, and (3) adapting bloom 
cache for general use. (1) The level of protection in the dynamic Bloom cache design can 
be changed as needed for performance or for security. (2)The bit verifications can be 
stored in a buffer to wait for the Bloom map to access the blocked Bloom from main 
memory. This can delay checks and would reduce the overhead as there could be multiple 
outstanding verifications at a time. As purported in [28], the most egregious of control 
flow hijacking attacks stem from hijacking system calls, so one can delay general calls 
for more efficient checking. (3) This Bloom Cache could potentially be used in other 
applications where there is spatial and temporal locality in queries. Bloom filters are 
currently used in database lookups of Google BigTable and Apache Cassandra [36] and 
malicious url checks of Google Chrome [37]. These applications could have spatial and 
temporal locality of access and may be improved. Specifically, this could be used to 
implement a firewall / malicious url checker on servers if requests are sufficiently local. 
The Bloom Cache could also be used for verifying certificate revocation lists quickly, 
assuming locality of access. Another possible application would be to check memory 
accesses and make sure no hacker maliciously makes changes immutable kernel regions. 






 In this work, I have researched and found that code re-use attacks are not sufficiently 
protected against in commodity solutions and that current implementations of solutions 
proposed in research, like CFI, either incur large performance overheads, weaken code 
compatibility, or are unscalable. To overcome performance and code compatibility 
issues, I use a Bloom-filter-based approach. To overcome scalability issues of a single-
Bloom-filter implementation, I propose several new methods to add spatial and temporal 
locality to a blocked bloom filter approach to reduce the amount of quickly-accessible 
cache space that must be used to maintain performance. The solution is also shown to be 
scalable as there is not necessarily a positive correlation between number of branches 
stored and performance overhead. The average performance overhead of using the 
proposed dynamic bloom cache to check all indirect branches is 5.7%, this being a 
conservative estimate as a Return Address Stack was not modeled. The overhead is an 
improvement to the 22% of the original CFI paper [1], and this configuration additionally 
solves code modularity issues. Using the proposed bloom cache structure also addresses 
the scalability issues of the configuration as proposed in the single bloom-filter 
architecture proposed by [10]. In summary, this work proposes a high-performing, 
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